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The parable of the Good Samaritan is a story of legal interpretation. 
As the story goes, a lawyer ask§ for the precise requirements for getting 
into heaven. The lawyer begins by setting out a supposedly established 
contractual principle: a person may enter heaven if he loves his neighbor 
as he would himself. The lawyer contends that this principle suffers 
from ambiguous language and asks for guidance in fleshing out the 
definition of "neighbor." Jesus answers the lawyer's request with the 
account of the Good Samaritan.! Unlike other passersby, the Good 
Samaritan comes to the aid of an injured stranger on the road, tending to 
the stranger's wounds and paying for his convalescence at a local inn.2 
The Samaritan's charity is all the more impressive because the stranger 
is a member of a rival religious sect.' After hearing the story, the lawyer 
realizes that the term "neighbor" is meant to be interpreted very broadly. 
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Thanks to Lindsay 
Bernstein for her valuable research assistance. 
1. Luke 10:25-37. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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Despite the parable's legal bent, Anglo-American law has been 
reluctant to impose a legal duty on individuals to aid or protect others. 
While our legal system may be sympathetic to moral teachings like the 
story of the Good Samaritan, a countervailing concern, the need to 
safeguard individual autonomy, has largely blocked imposition of such a 
duty. Tort law teaches that, barring unique circumstances, individuals 
are under no obligation to assist their fellow man, even when their 
failure to act may result in death.4 
Nevertheless, under certain conditions, courts will force us to 
embrace the better angels of our nature or face legal consequences. This 
Essay examines those conditions to assess whether they should have any 
bearing in setting the boundaries of contributory infringement law. 
More specifically, this Essay explores the situations where a defendant is 
obligated to protect others by controlling the tortious behavior of third 
parties. The rules establishing a duty to control another party are 
germane to commercial intermediaries who can face liability from the 
infringing acts of others. Should a duty be placed on providers of online 
services to control the actions of others for the benefit of intellectual 
property rights holders? For common law tort, such a duty arises only 
when a "special relationship" exists between the defendant and some 
other party, either the victim or the perpetrator, of the tortious act.5 I 
contend that it only makes sense to recognize a special relationship 
between online service providers and their infringing clients under a 
very limited set of conditions. 
Part I of this Essay describes existing contributory infringement 
doctrine. Part II examines the circumstances in tort law where courts 
have found that the relationship between the defendant and the direct 
actor justifies imposition of a duty to control the latter. Interestingly, the 
ability to manage the actions of the direct actor is not the only 
4. Matin Roger Scordato, Understandingthe Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in 
American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (2008). A few jurisdictions have enacted their 
own "Good Samaritan" laws. Joel Jay Finer, Toward GuidelinesforCompelling CesareanSurgery: 
Of Rights, Responsibility,and DecisionalAuthenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 257 n.100 (1991) 
(noting that "Good Samaritan" laws, while rare, exist in various states). But these laws typically 
only exempt actors from liability for their efforts to assist rather than creating a duty to come to the 
aid of another. See W. PAGE KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 
n.21 (5th ed. 1984) (identifying only three states that impose a duty, under certain limited 
conditions, to rescue another in peril); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (setting out a safe harbor under 
the subheading "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material" for 
Internet service providers that, in good faith, restrict access to indecent materials). 
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977). 
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requirement for imposing such a duty. Part III applies these findings 
from tort law to the specialized context of intellectual property. 
I. PLACING CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF TORT LAW 
All three of the main intellectual property regimes recognize the 
doctrine of contributory infringement. Under current doctrine, to be 
contributorily liable, the defendant must satisfy two criteria.6 First, the 
defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge that her actions 
are likely to facilitate infringement by another.7 Second, the defendant's 
actions must materially contribute to the infringement.8 
The Supreme Court has consistently located contributory 
infringement doctrine within the jurisprudence of common law tort.9 
Despite the absence of clear statutory authorization in the Copyright Act, 
the Court justified imposition of contributory liability for copyright 
infringement on the doctrine's prevalence in other legal realms.' ° 
Similarly, the Court approved contributory liability for trademark 
infringement based on common law principles of unfair competition. 1 
In the 2005 Grokster case, the Court cited a tort law treatise to bolster its 
decision to create a new "inducement" form of indirect liability for 
copyright infringement.12 Responding to this authority, the lower courts 
have recognized indirect liability for patent, copyright, and trademark 
6. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
7. See id. 
8. See id. A separate doctrine, vicarious liability, provides an alternate route for imposing 
liability on one party for the infringing conduct of another. The key difference between the two 
secondary liability theories is that vicarious liability is based solely on the relationship between the 
defendant and the direct infringer while contributory liability is based on the actions of the 
defendant as well as the defendant's state of mind in relation to the underlying infringement. 
Contributory infringement and vicarious infringement are discrete doctrines with differing 
theoretical justifications. 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PARRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:41 (2008). A 
discussion ofvicarious liability is beyond the scope of this paper. 
9. See generallyMGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). 
10. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,434-35 (1984). 
11. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., 
concurring). 
12. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. Inducement infringement holds responsible parties that 
encourage and specifically intend for the direct infringer to infringe. Id. at 919. All three of the 
main intellectual property regimes recognize some form of inducement infringement. See Charles 
W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 635, 636 
(2007). The key difference between standard contributory infringement and inducement 
infringement is that the latter requires "clear expression" of the defendant's intent to cause others to 
infringe. Grokster,545 U.S. at 919. 
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infringement and sometimes used common law tort jurisprudence as a 
talisman to ward off criticism of their indirect infringement decisions.' 
3 
However, when the specifics of modem indirect infringement case 
law are scrutinized, it is not clear that they owe much to tort law 
precedent. Instead, prudential concerns often provide the justification 
for contributory infringement decisions. Particularly in the case of 
online intermediaries, courts present contributory liability, not as the 
ineluctable result of established doctrine, but as a necessary weapon in 
the battle against direct infringers. 14 For example, in the Grokster 
decision, the Court started from the premise that mass online 
infringement threatened the holders of music and movie copyrights, and 
then worked backwards to articulate a new theory of contributory 
liability that would ensnare the developers of what it deemed to be a 
dangerous new technology.' 5 The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar 
solution-oriented approach in imposing liability on the Google search 
engine for providing the means for consumers to seek out and locate 
infringing websites.16 Even when finding in favor of the contributory 
defendant, courts tend to have one eye focused on the projected impact 
of their decision on economic incentives and consumer behavior. 
It is not clear that this is the best approach to adjudicating 
contributory infringement cases, which are often disputes between 
traditional intellectual property rights holders and technological 
pioneers. As several scholars have already commented, it is impossible 
to determine ex ante the precise economic effects of calibrating 
13. E.g., Hard Rock Caf&Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 
(7th Cir. 1992) ("To answer questions of this sort, we have treated trademark infringement as a 
species of tort and have turned to the common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate 
boundaries of liability."); Demetriades v. Kaufmnann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(contending that "copyright is analogous to a species of tort" and that vicarious and contributory 
liability in tort are "well-established precepts"); Transdermal Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contract 
Packaging, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining that contributory trademark 
infringement theory grew out of the common law). 
14. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 
(7th Cir. 2003); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
15. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929 ("The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, 
however, a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using 
StreamCast's and Grokster's software."); see also Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The 
Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of SecondaryLiability in Trademark and 
Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1409-10 (2006) (criticizing the prudentialist 
reasoning of the Groksterdecision). 
16. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701,728-29 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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contributory infringement law in one way or another.' 7 A technology 
that appears to threaten the incentives for intellectual property creation 
today may prove benign when examined years in the future. I" 
In light of the unreliability of this prudential approach to secondary 
infringement, it may be time to turn to a more in-depth analysis of tort 
law principles to help determine the boundaries of contributory 
infringement doctrine. The most natural source for guidance is the law 
of civil aiding and abetting. Aiding and abetting law parallels 
contributory infringement law as both doctrines require proof of a 
certain level of knowledge of the underlying illegal activity and a 
contribution to that activity by the contributory defendant. 19  The 
problem is that the law of aiding and abetting remains notoriously 
unsettled.20 Despite agreement that a successful plaintiff must establish 
that the defendant had knowledge of the direct actor's wrongful conduct 
and that the defendant substantially participated in the underlying tort, 
"[g]eneral confusion has surrounded the question of what exact test 
courts should use to determine liability.' Uncertainty exists as to the 
boundaries of the knowledge inquiry.22 Likewise, confusion exists as to 
how to define the "substantial participation" necessary for aiding and 
abetting. 3 In addition, the rules of aiding and abetting liability can 
change depending on jurisdiction,24 the type of party involved,25 and the 
underlying tort at issue.26 
17. See, e.g., George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual 
Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 21, 21-23 (John Palmer ed., 1986). 
18. See Tim Wu, The CopyrightParadox: UnderstandingGrokster,2005 SuP. CT.REv. 229, 
254 (2005) (discussing the Court's past reluctance to impose liability on new technologies like the 
record and the piano player given the Court's admitted inability to forecast the economic future). 
19. Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding andAbetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REv. 241, 
275 (2005) ("The fundamental basis for aiding and abetting liability is that the defendant both (1) 
knows of the primary actor's wrongful conduct; and (2) substantially assists or encourages the 
primary wrongdoer to so act."); see also In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" 
Litigation, 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
20. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cit. 1983); AT&T v. Winback, 42 F.2d 
1421, 1430 (3d Cir. 1994) ("And in fact, aiding and abetting liability is not a well-settled 
mechanism for imposing civil liability."). 
21. Combs, supra note 19, at 254-55. 
22. Id at 265-67, 283. See also Laura A. Heymann, Knowing How to Know: Secondary 
Liabilityfor Speech, (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (describing the inconsistent 
manner in which courts have applied the knowledge standard for contributory infringement). 
23. Combs, supra note 19, at 293 ("the confusion begins when one attempts to apply the 
principles ofthe substantial factor test to the theory of civil aiding and abetting"). 
24. See generally Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(reviewing cases from different jurisdictions that do and do not accept silence and inaction as a 
basis for aiding and abetting liability). 
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Given all of these uncertainties, the Supreme Court's directive to 
lower courts to evaluate contributory infringement in light of "rules of 
fault-based liability derived from the common law" is ambiguous at 
best.27 A schizophrenic body of aiding and abetting law offers no clear 
answer to the riddles of contributory infringement. Yet a separate but 
related area of tort doctrine may provide some guidance. In certain 
specified circumstances, tort law recognizes a duty to protect third 
parties from the actions of others. Like aiding and abetting, the law 
regards breach of the duty to protect third parties from others' 
misconduct as a distinct legal violation and not derivative of the direct 
actor's tort.28 The interesting question is when should such a duty be 
recognized? To a large degree, courts wrestling with contributory 
infringement claims are asking the same question. When liability is 
imposed, contributory infringement law obligates intellectual property 
intermediaries to police the infringing activities of others. In charting 
the boundaries of contributory infringement, it makes sense to consult a 
well-developed body of tort jurisprudence that has already engaged in 
some of the hard thinking about when it makes sense to burden someone 
with the obligation to prevent illegal conduct by others. The next part 
describes the reasons common law courts have offered for imposing a 
duty to control others. Part III asks whether these reasons are applicable 
in the specialized world of intellectual property infringement, 
particularly in the online context. 
II. TORT LAW'S REASONS FOR IMPOSING THE DUTY TO CONTROL ON 
OTHERS 
The general rule in tort law is that there is no duty to act for the 
protection of others. 29 There are two exceptions to the rule, however. 
First, there is a duty to render aid or protection when there is a particular 
sort of relationship between the defendant and the victim of the tortious 
25. E.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1071-72 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing 
qualified privilege for lawyers assisting in a client's breach of fiduciary duty to a third party). 
26. For example, courts in Georgia, Maine, Montana, and Virginia refuse to recognize a cause 
of action for aiding and abetting fraud. Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding andAbetting, 
61 Bus. LAW 1135, 1140 (2006). 
27. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,934-35 (2005). 
28. Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Mason, 
supranote 26, at 1139. 
29. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (Cal. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
315 (1977). 
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conduct.30 The Restatement of Torts recognizes five categories of 
relationships between a defendant and victim that trigger a duty of 
affirmative action.31 In all of these relationships, the former party 
maintains some sort of physical or economic power over the latter party. 
When the latter party is threatened with harm in the context of this 
relationship, the former party has a duty to take reasonable action to 
prevent such harm from occurring. For example, when a police officer 
places a suspect in handcuffs, the officer has a duty to protect the 
vulnerable suspect from assault by another.32 Such an obligation is 
justified under the notion that the victim's ability to protect himself is 
compromised by virtue of this relationship while the defendant is in a 
superior position to prevent harm from occurring.
3 3 
This exception probably has little bearing in the intellectual 
property context. Secondary infringement law is a hot topic today 
because of potential liability for online intermediaries.34  These 
intermediaries typically have no ongoing relationship with the 
intellectual property rights holders who contend that they are victims of 
infringement. Unlike a police officer and her prisoner or a mental 
hospital and its wards, internet intermediaries do not maintain financial 
or physical dominion over the intellectual property rights holders 
plagued by online infringement. For example, in a recent much 
discussed case involving contributory trademark infringement, an online 
auction site made possible the illegal activity of counterfeiters, who used 
the famous Tiffany mark to sell their own knockoff jewelry. Although 
the court found in favor of the auction house for different reasons, the 
auction house had no preexisting relationship with Tiffany, and thus, 
could not be deemed to have a duty to protect the jeweler's interests by 
virtue of a special relationship.35 
The second exception however, does resemble the experience of 
many online intermediaries. A duty to act affirmatively to prevent harm 
to another also arises when a "special relationship" exists between the 
30. Id. 
31. The five categories are: (I) carrier-passenger; (2) innkeeper-guest; (3) landowner-invitee; 
(4) custodian-ward; and (5) employer-employee. DAN C. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 857 (2000) 
32. See Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 947 P.2d 31, 40-41 (Kan. 1997); see also Young v. 
Huntsville Hosp., 595 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992) (hospital had duty to protect patient from 
sexual assault by others while she was anesthetized). 
33. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of ReligiousInstitutions to Protect 
Others:SurgicalInstruments, not Machetes,areRequired,74 U. CIN. L. REv. 11, 25-26 (2005). 
34. 5 PATRY, supranote 8, at § 21:55. 
35. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Tiffany does not 
sell or authorize the sale ofTiffany merchandise on eBay or other on line marketplaces."). 
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL 
defendant and theperpetratorof the harm.36 Even when such a special 
relationship is recognized and a duty to control the perpetrator is 
imposed, the defendant will only be liable when the tortious activity is 
reasonably foreseeable.37 In the remainder of this Part, I discuss the 
factors that courts rely on to decide if this special relationship exists. In 
certain limited situations, the hallmarks of a "special relationship"-an 
ability to control the actions of the tortfeasor, preservation of a sphere of 
autonomy for the defendant even after imposition of the duty to control, 
and evidence of the defendant's personal culpability-can be found in 
the interactions between an intermediary and a direct infringer. 
A. Control 
The first element deemed necessary for recognition of a special 
relationship between the defendant and the perpetrator is control over the 
perpetrator's tortious activities.38 To trigger a duty to police the conduct 
of the perpetrator, the defendant must have "taken charge" of the 
perpetrator. 39  This can be measured in various ways. Formal legal 
control over the defendant's activities will suffice. Thus, parole officers 
can become responsible for the actions of their parolees when armed 
with a court order conditioning parole on certain behavioral 
requirements such as drug testing and attendance at counseling 
sessions.4° Similarly, landlords, who typically have the authority to 
prevent certain behaviors on their property, are deemed to have 
sufficient control over their tenants.4' On the other hand, entities like 
voluntary treatment facilities, colleges, and halfway houses are routinely 
absolved from liability because they lack full physical custody and 
sufficient legal authority over their charges.42 
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977). 
37. See, e.g., Thomas v. City Lights Sch., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710 (D.D.C. 2000) ("A 
school's duty to supervise its students, however, is limited to a reasonable duty to guard against 
foreseeable harm."). 
38. Couch v. Wash. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197, 202 (Wash. App. 2002). 
39. Id. 
40. See Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 255-56 (Wash. 1992); Cole v. Indiana Dept. of Corr., 
616 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. App. 1993); see also King v. Durham County Mental Health, 439 S.E.2d 
771, 774 (N.C. App. 1994) (holding that without a court order mandating participation in a 
residential treatment program, defendant treatment facility did not have the necessary control for a 
"special relationship" with a violent patient). 
41. E.g., Parr v. McDade, 314 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (ind. App. 1974); R.B.Z. v. Warwick Dev. 
Co., 681 So.2d 566, 568 (Ala. App. 1996); Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums, 941 P.2d 218, 
220 (Ariz. 1997). 
42. E.g., Rousey v. U.S., 115 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1997); Bailor v. Salvation Army, 51 
F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 1995); Swanson v. Wabash Coll., 504 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. App. 1987). 
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Sufficient control may also be based on more informal 
understandings.43 The control element is satisfied when the court 
determines that the relationship between the defendant and the 
perpetrator matches a category of relationships where the perpetrator 
will ordinarily comply with the defendant's wishes, even if they are not 
legally mandated to do so. 4 If the relationship is one where the 
defendant is normally expected to monitor the activities of the 
perpetrator, a relationship of control is inferred.45 Thus, sufficient 
control to trigger the duty exists in the case of a parent whose six-year-
old child is playing outside with a rifle. Because a minor is expected to 
obey his parents, and parents are expected to monitor their children, if 
the parent is aware of the child's activity and fails to take action, the 
parent is liable to others for the child's gunplay.46  Although most 
employers lack a sufficient amount of control over their employees for a 
special relationship to be inferred, some courts have made an exception 
for churches and the priests associated with them because of the 
assumption that such organizations have greater influence over their 
employees' lives. 47 On the other hand, a passenger in a car driven by its 
owner will not be held responsible for the owner's reckless driving.48 
The reason, suggests one thoughtful treatment of the subject, is that 
social norms do not require one to obey or even acknowledge criticism 
of one's driving from a non-owner passenger. We all know how 
annoying backseat drivers are after all.49 Because we do not expect our 
passengers to instruct us on how to drive, it would be unfair to impose 
liability on passengers for the reckless behavior of their drivers. 
Sufficient control for a special relationship will also be found when 
the perpetrator uses an instrumentality knowingly provided by the 
defendant to commit the harmful act. Section 318 of the Restatement of 
Torts imposes liability when the defendant allows her chattels to be used 
by a third person. 50 Thus, car owners can be held responsible for the 
reckless driving of their vehicles by others.5' Likewise, a grocery store 
43. Cf Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (finding a "special 
relationship" between defendant and victim because they were "companions on a social venture"). 
44. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct ofAnother, 43 
YALE L.J. 886, 891 (1934). 
45. Id. 
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 316 cmt. b, illus. 1. 
47. E.g., C.J.C. v. Corp. ofCatholic Bishops ofYakima, 985 P.2d 262, 275 (Wash. 1999). 
48. E.g., Olson v. lsche, 343 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Minn. 1984). 
49. See Harper & Kime, supranote 44, at 891. 
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977). 
51. Smith v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 308, 316 (Mich. 1969). 
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may be liable for the misconduct of its patrons when the instrument of 
their misconduct is one of its own shopping carts.52 The rationale for 
imposing liability on the defendant in such a situation is that it is 
assumed that one has control over her own property. 
There are some qualifications to the rule imposing liability on 
parties that own instrumentalities used wrongfully by others. The 
defendant must know or should know that it has the ability to control the 
tortfeasor's use of its chattel.53 In most cases, sufficient control will 
only be inferred if the perpetrator uses the property in the defendant's 
presence.54 Similarly, no special relationship exists if the defendant did 
not have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the wrongful use of the 
instrumentality. 55 Thus, the law only imposes a duty to control on those 
actually in a position to stop the wrongful conduct. 
Even if a court finds the required amount of control in the 
defendant-perpetrator relationship, this is not sufficient to impose a duty 
on the defendant.56 Two other elements must be satisfied before a duty 
to control will be imposed. Broadly speaking, in addition to its control 
analysis, a court will likely address the defendant's autonomy and 
personal culpability. With respect to autonomy, a court will examine 
how greatly the imposition of a duty to control will circumscribe the 
defendant's freedom of action. Regarding culpability, the court will 
look for signs of the defendant's personal blameworthiness, beyond the 
evidence of its control over the tortfeasor. 
B. Autonomy 
Admittedly, autonomy and culpability are vague concepts that 
could be subject to many potential meanings. Nevertheless, some rules 
52. Meade v. Kings Supermarket-Orange, 366 A.2d 978, 979 (N.J. 1976); see also Cashnan 
v. Reider's Stop-N-Shop Supermarket, 504 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Ohio App. 1986) (Parino, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977). 
54. Harper & Kime, supra note 44, at 888-89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 
(1977) ("If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession ... , he is, if 
present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them .... "); Knight v. Rower, 742 A.2d 1237, 1240-42 (Vt. 
1999) (finding no social host liability for landowning parents who were not present when alcohol 
was being served on their property). 
55. Pulka v. Edelman, 358N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976). 
56. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the ReasonablenessofStrangers:Some ObservationsAbout 
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or ProtectOthers, 1991 WiS. L. REV. 
867, 888-89 & n.86; DOBBS, supranote 31, at 895. 
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of thumb can be gleaned from the case law regarding what types of 
evidence satisfy these components of the special relationship 
requirement. In a sense, the entire body of law that limits duties to act 
for another's protection or benefit to "special relationships" is based on a 
respect for individual autonomy. In large part, the need to preserve 
individual freedom of action has trumped countervailing theories of a 
moral duty to act.57 It is understandable that this concern with autonomy 
remains a part of the special relationship analysis. Regarding the 
defendant's autonomy interest, the court will evaluate the potential 
number of parties that the defendant will be forced to regulate ifa duty is 
imposed. Even when the relationship at issue clearly demonstrates 
sufficient control of the wrongful actor, courts will refuse to recognize a 
duty that threatens to subject the defendant to unlimited or unduly 
burdensome litigation. Thus, while landowners may have a duty to 
control the wrongful behavior of others on their land, this duty is 
typically only triggered when the wrongful actor is an invitee.58 
Although it might be possible to take action to prevent even trespassers 
from engaging in unlawful conduct on one's land, courts refuse to 
require such precautionary measures, in part, because of the great burden 
it would place on all landowners.59 Similarly, social hosts typically have 
no responsibility for regulating the use of instrumentalities brought onto 
their property by their guests. As one court explained, the problem with 
imposing a duty to control such activity is that every host would be 
exposed to considerable litigation for all sorts of conduct involving 
usually benign items like fireworks, sporting equipment, and alcohol.6° 
In performing this analysis of the burden resulting from such a duty 
to control, courts not only examine the fiscal responsibilities such a duty 
entails, but also "the more esoteric costs involved with requiring certain 
actions to relieve potential liability. ' '61 For example, autonomy interests 
have been cited as a reason against imposing a duty on a pregnant 
woman to avoid negligently harming her fetus. 62 Although such a duty 
would not create crushing financial burdens for pregnant women, it 
57. See Wendy E. Parmet,Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on 
Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (2003); Richard Epstein, A Theory of 
StrictLiability, 2 J.LEG. STUD. 151, 198 (1973). 
58. See Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assoc., 802 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Wash. 1991). 
59. Id. at 1369. 
60. Luoni v. Berube, 729 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Mass. 2000). 
61. Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 838-39 (Mass. 2006). 
62. See Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 263-64 (Mass. 2004); see also Chenault v. 
Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477-78 (Tex. App. 1999). 
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would impose the "esoteric costs" courts consider, as such a duty would 
implicate almost every action of a pregnant woman's daily life.63 
In addition, the court will likely assess whether imposition of a duty 
threatens to tarnish an important relationship between the defendant and 
the tortfeasor. Thus, while some jurisdictions recognize a special 
relationship between psychiatrists and their patients,64 others refuse to 
impose a duty on psychiatrists because of concerns over destroying the 
confidential environment needed for successful therapy.65 Similarly, 
despite an obvious ability to control, courts have refused to find a special 
relationship between military commanders and their personnel.66 The 
case law suggests that relationships that require privacy and 
confidentiality to flourish are not appropriate candidates for a duty to 
control. 
C. Culpability 
Even if the control and autonomy elements are satisfied, a court 
will be loathe to find a special relationship unless there are also indices 
of the defendant's personal blameworthiness. One rule of thumb is that 
unless the relationship involves physical custody over the perpetrator, 
courts are reluctant to impose a duty on noneconomic relationships.67 In 
other words, the controlling actor in a business relationship is more 
likely to be deemed personally blameworthy than others. Thus, a 
defendant had no responsibility for the conduct of her historically violent 
on-again, off-again boyfriend when she invited another man to her 
house.68 The court seemed to think that the longstanding noneconomic 
social contact between the defendant and the boyfriend did not fit under 
the category of "special relationships."69 In contrast, businesses are 
routinely found liable for injuries to visitors from the conduct of third 
persons on their property.70  The economic relationship between a 
business and a tortious customer qualifies as a "special relationship," at 
63. Jupin, 849 N.E.2d at 838-40. 
64. E.g., Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Fain. Counseling Ct., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (Ohio 
1997); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311 (Mo. App. 1995). 
65. E.g., Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446,448 (Fla. App. 1991). 
66. E.g., Hallett v. U.S. Dept. ofNavy, 850 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. Nev. 1994). 
67. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 33, at 25-26; Melissa Cassedy, Note, The Doctrine of 
LenderLiability,40 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 175 (1988). 
68. Fiala v. Rains, 519 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Iowa 1994). 
69. Id. 
70. Harper & Kine, supranote 44, at 903. 
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least when the injury occurs on the business's premises. 71 When the 
relationship between the defendant and the perpetrator is established to 
enrich the defendant, a special relationship is likely to be inferred. To 
some degree, this conforms to common expectations. We expect 
business owners to keep us safe from other customers but we do not 
usually expect one-half of a romantic duo to control the behavior of the 
other.72 
A court is also more likely to find a special relationship if the 
defendant is responsible for creating and maintaining the entire 
environment where the misconduct took place. It stands to reason that 
someone who provides the arena for someone else to commit wrongful 
conduct is more blameworthy than the person who provided more 
limited assistance. Thus, while colleges and universities are usually 
deemed to not have a special relationship with their students, courts will 
impose a duty when the college owns and maintains the property where 
the tortious activities took place.73 Similarly, innkeepers have a duty to 
control unruly guests, and common carriers have a duty to control the 
tortious behavior of their passengers.74 Moreover, some courts have 
suggested that a defendant homeowner may be liable for a failure to 
control a third party inside their home, even when she is not present 
when the wrongful act takes place.75  Thus, although not explicitly 
mentioned in the case law, it seems that courts are more likely to impose 
the duty to control when the defendant has created the entire 
environment where the misconduct occurs. 
Finally, if the tortfeasor used an instrumentality of the defendant to 
commit the wrongful act and the instrumentality is particularly 
dangerous, then the court is more likely to view the defendant as 
deserving of blame. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found a 
special relationship between a mentally ill adult that shot a police officer 
71. Id. 
72. See Bauswell v. Mauzey, 936 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1996) (babysitter not 
responsible for sexual molestation of children by her husband); see also Cuppy v. Bunch, 214 
N.W.2d 786, 788 (S.D. 1974) (one friend is not expected to control the inebriated conduct of 
another friend). 
73. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) (holding that university owed 
legal duty to control students who injured another during a hazing ritual); cf Collete v. Tolleson 
Unified Sch. Dist., 54 P.3d 823, 832 (Ariz. App. 2002) (holding that school had no duty to control 
operation of its students' motor vehicles while off campus, even if the school had a closed campus 
policy). 
74. E.g., Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 873 A.2d 483, 490 (Md. Spec. App. 2005). 
75. See, e.g., Chavez v. Torres, 991 P.2d 1, 6-7 (N.M. App. 1999). 
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and the girlfriend of the adult's father.76 Because the girlfriend allowed 
her boyfriend to house dangerous firearms in her home, the court found 
that she had a duty to prevent her boyfriend's son from removing any of 
the firearms. Key to the court's analysis, in a section of the opinion 
entitled "public policy," was the recognition that "[a] firearm is a 
dangerous instrumentality. 77 The dangerousness of the instrumentality, 
the court explained, justified imposition of a duty to control others that 
would not pertain in the case of more benign instruments.78 Similarly, 
the Restatement cautions that "if the chattel is one which can be safely 
used only if extreme caution is employed," then violation of a duty to 
control may be found for anything less than the owner's "constant 
vigilance" of third party users.79 
III. APPLICATION TO CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT 
Contributory infringement law may be gravitating towards some of 
the same considerations as courts evaluating the duty of a defendant to 
control the tortious behavior of others.80 Courts already study the 
amount of control the contributory defendant has over the direct 
infringer. They also indirectly evaluate some of the autonomy and 
culpability concerns referred to in Part II. Yet this evaluation is not 
conducted in the same systematic way as decisions made regarding the 
presence or absence of a "special relationship." In this Part, I examine 
recent contributory infringement disputes under the template of "special 
relationship" jurisprudence. The result is an approach to contributory 
infringement that is slightly different than the current paradigm and that 
would exempt most purveyors of online technologies. 
A. Evidence ofControl 
If the tort doctrine described in Part II is applied in the context of 
online intermediaries, in most cases, a special relationship would not 
exist. Three elements comprise a special relationship within the 
meaning of the Restatement. First, there must be a relationship of 
control over the direct infringer. Second, imposition of the duty must 
not overly restrict the defendant's autonomy. Third, there must be 
76. Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Mass. 2006). 
77. Id.at 838. 
78. Id. 
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 cmt. c (1977). 
80. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Palsgraf Principles of Tort Law, and the Persistent Need for 
Common-Law Judgment in IPInfringement Cases,3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. L.J.21 (2009). 
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evidence demonstrating the defendant's personal culpability. With 
regard to the first element, a court would need to investigate the working 
terms of the relationship between providers of Internet technologies and 
their users to determine if the former has "taken charge" of the latter. At 
first blush, the relationship between intermediaries and actual infringers 
seems much less coercive than the relationship between parole officers 
and parolees or other entities granted formal legal control over others. 
Yet the contractual terms of agreements between certain online 
intermediaries and their customers can be extremely one sided. Under 
the terms of service required to participate in most virtual worlds or 
social networking sites, the website developer has the right to monitor 
for infringing content, and remove that infringing content without 
notice.81 Similarly, sites relying on user-generated content like YouTube 
ensure that they retain a license in user-contributed materials, including 
the ability to reproduce, distribute, and prepare derivative works of 
submitted videos.82 In assessing the presence of a special relationship, 
what is key is determining whether the terms of a legal agreement or 
court order provide the defendant with authority to control the specific 
type of misconduct at issue.83 A court may conclude that agreements 
between Internet entities and their users match this standard. Very often, 
the terms of end-user license agreements specifically address the issue of 
infringement. 84 
Even if formal legal control over the infringer is not found, 
sufficient control may be found based on the intermediary's actual 
behavior. A technologist that engages in regular monitoring of its 
client's activities demonstrates more control than one that does not 
engage in such surveillance. Intermediaries accused of infringement 
often do monitor their users' conduct. In fact, one might argue that such 
monitoring by content organizers has come to be expected. On the other 
hand, it is unclear whether there is a real social expectation that most 
81. See Second Life Terms of Service Agreement, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php 
(last visited February 23, 2009). 
82. YouTube Terms of Use, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Jan 7, 2008). 
83. Couch v. Wash. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 197, 204 (Wash. App. Div. 2002) (holding that 
insufficient control existed for a special relationship between a parolee and a parole office 
supervising only the parolee's legal financial obligation). 
84. See Britton Payne, Note, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book 
Heroes and the DMCA, and a FilteringSolutionfor Infringing Digital Creations, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 969-70 (2006) (describing EULA for City of Heroes); 
Michelle Delio, Rude Awakening for File Sharers, http'//www.wired.com/news/print/ 
0,1294,60386,00.html (describing EULA for Kazaa software) (last visited Jan 7,2008). 
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Internet intermediaries will exercise their discretion to alter their user's 
conduct. For some, the appeal ofthe Internet is its lack of authority." 
A key issue in determining whether the control element has been 
satisfied will be whether the direct infringer uses an instrumentality to 
infringe that has been provided by the defendant. The Restatement of 
Torts recognizes a special relationship when the defendant's chattels or 
instruments are used for tortious conduct with the defendant's 
knowledge.8 6 As discussed above, many of the operative terms of 
service for online games and social networking sites reveal that the 
network developer already is aware of the potential for infringement. 
This may suggest to a court that the website's capabilities for the 
copying and distribution of intellectual property are instrumentalities 
used to infringe with the website's knowledge.8 7 Under these 
circumstances, a court might conclude that sufficient control exists 
between the site owner and the direct infringer.88 
On the other hand, another part of any analysis would be the real 
capability of the defendant to prevent the infringing activity of the direct 
infringer. If appropriate remedial action is not possible, then there 
should be no liability for failure to control. Courts routinely reject 
imposition of a duty to control when there was no real opportunity for 
the defendant to control the tortfeasor's conduct.8 9 According to the 
Restatement, in situations where an instrumentality of the defendant is 
used tortiously by another, a duty to control may only be found when the 
defendant is present while the instrumentality is used.90 Courts reason 
that when a defendant is not physically present, it lacks the ability to 
review use of its instrumentality and stop the tortious behavior.
91 
Of course, most infringing intermediaries are not physically present 
when the direct infringement occurs. Therefore, a rigid interpretation of 
the presence requirement would preclude liability on the basis of 
85. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising in the Garden of Eden, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 755 
(2007) (discussing the anti-trademark protection ethos ofvirtual worlds). 
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977). 
87. See Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749, 826 (2008). 
88. Jason C. Breen, YouTube or YouLose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement 
Lawsuit?, 16 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 151, 172 (2007). 
89. E.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 642 A.2d 219, 226-27 (Md. 1994) (no special 
relationship between mental hospital and patient when plaintiff injures others after escaping from 
hospital grounds); cf Meany v. Newell, 352 N.W.2d 779, 781(Minn. App. 1984) (even if accident 
took place off premises, because consumption of alcohol took place on employer's premises, 
employer had duty to control actions of employee). 
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1977). 
91. See, e.g., Knight v. Rower, 742 A.2d 1237, 1243 (Vt. 1999). 
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providing an instrumentality used to infringe. The Restatement, 
however, suggests that courts may adopt a broader view of this 
requirement that does not demand the defendant's actual presence at the 
scene of the misconduct. In a caveat to the section of the Restatement 
involving the duties of land and chattel owners, the authors explain that 
they express "no opinion as to whether there may not be a duty of 
reasonable care to control the conduct of the third person . . where the 
[defendant], although not present, is in the vicinity, is informed of the 
necessity and opportunity of exercising such control, and can easily do 
so." '92 Some courts have used this caveat to suggest that defendant 
property owners may be liable for a failure to control a third party on 
their property even when they are not present when the wrongful act 
93 takes place. Thus, the defendant's failure to be physically present at 
the moment of the tortious conduct does not necessarily preclude a 
finding of a special relationship. It is an open question whether a 
business's monitoring and surveillance of the infringer's online activities 
renders the business in the "vicinity" of the infringing conduct, and 
therefore part of a special relationship. 
B. Autonomy andCulpabilityConcerns 
With regard to the second element, a court would need to scrutinize 
the impact of imposing a duty to control the direct infringer on the 
intermediary's autonomy interests. Common law courts have 
traditionally been wary of imposing a duty on relationships between the 
defendant and tortfeasor that involve a need for confidentiality and 
reciprocity. Such concerns seem unlikely when considering the situation 
of indirect and direct infringers, however. Most contributory 
infringement cases involve interactions between business entities and 
their clients, a far different type of interaction than the social and 
familial relationships that courts have been careful to preserve. 
Another consideration would be the potential number of third 
parties that the defendant would be obligated to control upon recognition 
of a special relationship. A court would consider whether the defendant 
is socially and economically positioned to manage such risk, or is 
already sufficiently burdened with other responsibilities. In many cases, 
the analysis might boil down to an assessment of the defendant's ability 
to detect infringing conduct or to filter infringing content out of its 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 caveat (1977). 
93. See, e.g., Chavez v. Torres, 991 P.2d 1, 6-7 (N.M. App. 1999). 
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system. To some extent, courts already conduct such an analysis in 
contributory infringement cases.94  What the special relationship 
jurisprudence contributes is that a special relationship should never be 
recognized between an intermediary and someone unknown to the 
intermediary, or someone who only enjoys a transitory relationship with 
the intermediary. Instead, the scope of the duty would need to be 
confined to parties familiar with the defendant. This consideration 
would impact different infringement intermediaries in different ways. 
For many intermediaries, the direct infringer would be a client of theirs. 
A typical business's duty to act upon knowledge of its clients' 
preventable wrongdoing seems unlikely to jeopardize the business's 
autonomy interests.95 But for businesses that rely on user generated 
content, their relationship with the direct infringer is often fleeting at 
best. For example, YouTube allows its users to upload content to its 
site, copies the content into its own software, stores the content on its 
own servers, and then allows the content to be accessed by the general 
public, all with a minimum of interaction or identification of the user.96 
As part of this procedure, videos that are longer than ten minutes are 
screened out. In large part, this process is automatic, which results in 
over one billion videos viewed per day.97 In such a situation, a 
responsibility to supervise the conduct of content posters may prove too 
taxing to the freedom that courts believe individual entities should 
possess. 
In addition to considering the defendant's autonomy interests, a 
court would need to assess the metrics of personal blameworthiness. If 
the relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant is economic, 
recognition of a special relationship is more likely. Common law courts 
have already determined that noneconomic relationships must place the 
perpetrator in the custodial control of the defendant before a duty to 
protect others can be triggered. However, such formalized control is not 
94. E.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also A & 
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming shut-
down order where Napster "failed to prevent infringement of all of plaintiffs' noticed copyrighted 
works" because "more could be done to maximize the effectiveness of the new filtering 
mechanism"). 
95. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Rechanik, 249 F. Appx. 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
software seller contributorily liable for "ostrich-like business practices" in purchasing counterfeit 
software from customers and then reselling it without checking the software for authenticity). 
96. Branwen Buckley, Suetube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 235, 235-36 (2008). 
97. Kevin J. Delaney, Google Push to Sell Ads on YouTube Hits Snags, WALL ST.J., July 9, 
2008 at Al. 
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required for interactions deemed economic. But to be deemed 
economic, the defendant must directly profit off of the direct actor. 
Merely using the direct actor to defray costs or as a conduit to other 
parties that can provide necessary funds is insufficient.98 Given this 
precedent, many Internet intermediaries would likely be absolved from a 
duty to control infringers. In many cases, the intermediary does not 
charge a fee for use of its online service, making its relationship with its 
users not only somewhat attenuated but also not strictly economic. 99 For 
example, entities may post infringing materials on YouTube for free. 
Thus, for YouTube and other websites featuring user-generated content, 
their relationship with the direct infringer would be deemed 
noneconomic and less likely to be subject to a duty to control. 
In looking for evidence of personal blame, courts also consider 
whether the defendant was responsible for creating the total environment 
where the tortious conduct by another could take place. Thus, another 
part of the culpability calculation would be to determine whether the 
contributory defendant put in place all of the necessary conditions for 
another to infringe. In one sense, online intermediaries do provide the 
entire arena where infringement occurs. Copyright infringement occurs 
on YouTube because YouTube provides the means to upload protected 
works and then distribute them to millions of potential viewers. Virtual 
worlds like Second Life create virtual environs where someone else's 
trademark can be copied, and then used commercially in a confusing 
manner. On the other hand, one might argue that instead of providing 
the environmental tools where infringement may take place, these 
businesses actually only provide a service that real world users employ 
° in their own physical space to infringe. 10 Remember that the special 
relationship jurisprudence holds that a duty to control will usually be 
imposed when an instrumentality of the defendant is used by another to 
commit a tort. Recognizing this rule, the Seventh Circuit has tried to 
draw a distinction between a defendant's instrumentalities and its online 
services, holding that control sufficient for a special relationship exists 
only over uses of the former.' 0' If other courts agree with the Seventh 
98. See Elizondo v. Ramirez, 753 N.E.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Il. App. 2001) (holding that 
collection of small cover charge is insufficient to establish special relationship of business invitor 
and invitee). 
99. See Michael D. Main & Christopher V. Popov, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.: Liabilityfor Third 
PartyContenton SocialNetworking Sites, 25 CoMM. LAW. 3, 5 (Spring 2007). 
100. For two contrasting takes on the relevance of comparing cyberspace to real world 
conditions, see Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace,91 CAL. L. REv. 521 (2003) and Richard 
A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role ofSelf-Help in Cyberspace?,J. L. ECON & POLY. 147 (2005). 
101. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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Circuit, then online service providers like Linden Labs, the makers of 
Second Life, could not be viewed as providing the total environment for 
infringement. 
Another part of the culpability calculation would be to scrutinize 
the "dangerousness" of the technology at issue. A benign or neutral 
technology only rarely used for an infringing purpose would not 
implicate a special relationship between the technologist and the direct 
infringer. Most search engines would not enjoy a special relationship 
with the direct infringer since search engines are used for mostly non-
infringing purposes. Nevertheless, one can envision some circumstances 
where a technology becomes "notorious" as primarily a mechanism for 
infringement and would be deemed a dangerous instrumentality by the 
court. 0 2 Of course, to some degree, this begs the question as to how 
much infringing activity there must be for a finding of "dangerousness." 
A similar conundrum plagues current contributory infringement 
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court has yet to provide a definition of 
"substantial non-infringing use."103 Such values are difficult to quantify. 
What the "dangerousness" metric provides is one factor among many 
that a court can consider to determine if a duty should be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
In evaluating the legal responsibility of indirect actors for 
intellectual property infringement, courts, in effect, are deciding whether 
to impose a duty to control the conduct of others. In a variety of 
alternative contexts, common law courts have made a similar 
determination. The general rule is that there is no duty to prevent 
tortious behavior by another. When a "special relationship" exists 
between the defendant and the direct tortfeasor, however, a duty to adopt 
reasonable strategies to control foreseeable illegal conduct is triggered. 
Although a "special relationship" analysis of potential contributory 
infringers leaves many questions, it does offer a new way to evaluate 
contributory liability that relies on an impressive body of past case law, 
providing additional legal content where it has been sorely needed. 
Courts need to be cautious in inferring such special relationships in 
the interactions between direct infringers and their intermediaries. Some 
businesses may truly guide the actions of direct infringers, leaving them 
little discretion in their misdeeds. Others, however, particularly in the 
102. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,924 (2005). 
103. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984). 
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online context, provide standardized functionality that can be used as the 
potential infringer sees fit. Imposing a duty to control on such actors 
contradicts traditional notions of responsibility. In most cases, these 
entities should not be held contributorily liable for the infringement of 
others. Online intermediaries make tempting targets for infringement 
suits given their deep financial resources, but imposing a duty on every 
such intermediary, regardless of the nature of its involvement with the 
direct infringer, would threaten the survival of nascent technologies and 
their ability to promote beneficial social change. As one important 
twentieth century figure recognized: "No one would remember the Good 
Samaritan ifhe'd only had good intentions-he had money as well."'1 4 
104. Interview by Brian Walden with Margaret Thatcher, in London, England (Jan. 6, 1980). 
